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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This interlocutory appeal was filed by several law 
enforcement officers who were involved to varying degrees in 
a prolonged pursuit of a fleeing motorist, Corey Bland. The 
pursuit involved the use of lethal force against Bland, who 
sustained severe injuries after he was shot between 16 and 18 
times. The question presented is whether the District Court 
committed legal error when it denied the officers summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the 
officers’ conduct was within the bounds of the Supreme 
Court’s relevant decisions regarding the use of lethal force, we 
will reverse.  
I 
A. Initial Pursuit 
 In the early evening of December 26, 2011, Newark 
Police received a report that a black Audi bearing Pennsylvania 
license plate number PZK821C had been carjacked at 
gunpoint. Approximately three hours later, New Jersey State 
Troopers James Thompson and Brian Murphy spotted the 
carjacked vehicle in Newark. Appellee Corey Bland was 
behind the wheel. The troopers activated their police lights, but 
Bland failed to stop. Instead, he accelerated and began to drive 
recklessly, running red lights and shutting off his headlights as 
he went. The troopers lost sight of the Audi, but an officer from 
the Summit Police Department began following it shortly 
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thereafter. Bland nearly struck that officer’s vehicle and 
collided with an embankment, but he continued driving. He 
reached speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, weaving in and 
out of light traffic. 
 State Trooper John Oliveira joined the chase in his 
marked police car after receiving reports that units from the 
State Police and Summit Police Departments were pursuing a 
carjacked vehicle. State Trooper Miguel Holguin,1 driving an 
unmarked Chrysler 300 accompanied by State Troopers 
Anthony Sardanopoli and Stephen Riefler, got involved after 
hearing a radio broadcast by Thompson and Murphy 
containing details about the carjacked vehicle. Bland continued 
to drive recklessly, frequently changing lanes, disregarding 
traffic lights, turning his lights off, accelerating to more than 
80 miles an hour in an area with a 25-mile-per-hour speed limit, 
and driving over a curb in an empty parking lot, which caused 
the Audi to begin to smoke. Despite all this, the Audi was not 
disabled, and Bland continued to evade police. 
B. Lincoln Park Events 
 Eventually, Bland began driving the wrong way down 
Lincoln Park, a one-way street. While doing so, he collided 
both with Thompson and Murphy in their marked state police 
car and an occupied Newark Police vehicle. When Bland hit 
the Newark police car, he was travelling approximately 25 to 
35 miles per hour, and the impact caused the police car to strike 
an unoccupied parked car. As a result, the Audi, the police car, 
and the unoccupied car became entangled. State Trooper 
                                              
 1 Discrepancies exist about the spelling of this trooper’s 
name. We adopt the spelling provided by the trooper in his 
deposition.  
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Thomas Espinoza, who had received a radio transmission 
about an ongoing pursuit involving a vehicle carjacked at 
gunpoint, arrived on the scene shortly after these collisions.  
 Numerous officers surrounded the Audi, including 
Murphy, Thompson, Oliveira, Sardanopoli, Espinoza, and 
State Trooper William Legg.2 Many of the officers ordered 
Bland to surrender, and one officer attempted to break the 
Audi’s window by striking it. During this encounter, the six 
state troopers fired a total of 28 shots, none of which hit Bland. 
Newark Police Officer Thomas Del Mauro was present at 
Lincoln Park, but he did not discharge his weapon. 
 There is no evidence in the record that Bland attempted 
to surrender at this time. Instead, he revved the Audi’s engine, 
spun its tires, and tried to get the vehicle to accelerate. Bland 
ultimately freed the Audi from the Newark police car by 
reversing and striking the now-unoccupied state police car a 
second time.3 He then drove over a curb and through a public 
park.  
 Upon exiting the park, Bland continued to speed 
through Newark with his lights off, at times on roads populated 
with vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Officers and state 
                                              
 2 Bland does not identify any actions taken by Riefler or 
Holguin at Lincoln Park.  
 3 Both the Newark officers and the state troopers 
contend that Bland drove aggressively at the officers as he 
attempted to flee, but Bland disputes this characterization. That 
dispute is immaterial, however, because all parties agree that 
officers were standing less than 10 feet from the Audi as Bland 
extricated it from the two vehicles.  
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troopers continued to pursue Bland, but Thompson and 
Murphy were no longer involved because their vehicle was 
disabled when it was struck by the Audi at Lincoln Park. 
During this portion of the chase, a state police car struck an 
occupied civilian vehicle. Bland eventually drove to the 
intersection of 18th Avenue and Livingston Street, where the 
most vigorously disputed series of events took place. 
C. The Terminus of the Chase 
 At the intersection of 18th and Livingston, the 
unmarked Chrysler 300 driven by Holguin allegedly rammed 
the Audi, sending the Audi into scaffolding that surrounded a 
school. State Troopers Holguin, Sardanopoli, and Riefler 
exited the Chrysler 300 and moved toward the Audi, which 
remained entangled in the scaffolding. Holguin approached the 
driver’s side with Riefler standing behind him, while 
Sardanopoli moved to the Audi’s passenger side.  
 All three troopers began firing their weapons at the 
Audi. Holguin and Riefler testified that they initially 
discharged their weapons because Bland refused to comply 
with their orders to show his hands and to stop moving and 
because he repeatedly threatened to kill the officers. 
Sardanopoli stated that he fired his weapon after he saw 
Holguin firing. Legg—also on the scene—asserted that he fired 
because he could see Bland moving around in the Audi as 
Holguin and Riefler discharged their weapons. Bland, for his 
part, denied that the troopers shouted any verbal commands or 
that he made evasive movements, but he conceded that nothing 
in the record contradicts the officers’ allegations that he 
threatened to kill them.  
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 After the first volley of shots, Riefler approached the 
driver’s side of the Audi, whereupon Riefler testified that 
Bland attempted to climb through the window while again 
threatening to kill him. In response, Riefler fired his weapon 
again. Espinoza also discharged his weapon, as did Newark 
Officers Del Mauro, Reuben Torres, and David Martinez, who 
had heard about the carjacking at roll call earlier that evening. 
The Newark officers stated that they fired their weapons 
because they saw the Audi moving or heard it revving, 
indicating that it was still capable of flight. Bland disputed this 
assertion, arguing instead that the Audi became inoperable 
once it crashed into the scaffolding. Oliveira, though present, 
did not discharge his weapon at the terminus.  
 The shooting finally ceased once Riefler observed 
Bland slumped over, and a Newark sergeant called for the 
officers to hold their fire. Bland was shot between 16 and 18 
times, including in the face, chest, and abdomen. He suffered 
numerous injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, 
respiratory failure, vision loss, and multiple facial fractures. No 
gun was recovered from the scene, and no officer observed 
Bland with a weapon during the course of the pursuit. 
II 
 Bland and his wife Virginia filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division alleging (among 
other things) that Defendants violated Bland’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 10:6-2(c). Defendants removed the case to federal court and 
sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. 
 After oral argument, the District Court concluded that it 
was “not in a position to grant or deny qualified immunity.” 
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App. 78. Instead, it held that a jury must first decide two issues 
of material fact: (1) whether the Audi’s engine was revving 
(and thus whether the car was capable of moving) after it 
crashed into the scaffolding; and (2) whether the officers could 
see Bland’s movements inside the vehicle. The District Court 
opined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014), issued three years after the 
car chase, may decide the “central” question of “whether or not 
Corey Bland was an active threat to the officers at the terminus 
so as to justify their actions in using deadly force to end that 
risk.” App. 73. Accordingly, it denied Defendants’ motion, 
including with respect to the three officers who were neither 
present nor discharged their weapons at the terminus of the 
chase. Defendants moved for a stay of trial, which the District 
Court denied. We entered an order staying the district court 
proceedings pending the resolution of this timely interlocutory 
appeal. 
III 
A 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Dougherty v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted). Our jurisdiction lies “only to the extent that the order 
turns on an issue of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks, 
citation, and alteration omitted). We “possess jurisdiction to 
review whether the set of facts identified by the district court 
is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right,” but “we lack jurisdiction to consider 
whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts 
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that the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.”4 Id. 
(quoting Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d 
Cir. 2002)). “To the extent we have jurisdiction, this Court 
exercises plenary review.” Id. 
 Summary judgment is proper only when the record 
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “affect[s] the outcome 
of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether 
a genuine dispute of material fact exists, we view the 
underlying facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the party opposing the motion. Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986. 
B 
 “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials 
from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 
S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). In resolving questions of 
qualified immunity, “courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry: 
                                              
 4 The Newark officers argue that the District Court erred 
by considering Bland’s expert testimony, which purported to 
establish that the Audi was incapable of moving once it crashed 
into the scaffolding. We do not have jurisdiction to review this 
ruling. See Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 409 
(3d Cir. 2007) (noting that, in appeals from denials of qualified 
immunity, “we lack jurisdiction to review questions of 
‘evidence sufficiency’” and must instead confine ourselves to 
“pure questions of law”). 
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(1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the official’s conduct.” L.R. v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016). We may 
tackle these steps “in the order we deem most appropriate for 
the particular case before us.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 
418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 
 Just two terms ago, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
“longstanding principle that clearly established law should not 
be defined at a high level of generality,” but must instead “be 
particularized to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. 
Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also L.R., 836 F.3d at 248. Moreover, at the time 
the action is taken, the “legal principle [must] clearly prohibit 
the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before 
him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear 
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. 
Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Thus, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 341 (1986)). 
C 
 The District Court focused its analysis on the events that 
occurred at the terminus of the reckless flight that ensued after 
Bland failed to comply with the traffic stop initiated by the 
New Jersey State Police. We begin by discussing the deadly 
force used by six of the state troopers at Lincoln Park, and we 
conclude that they are all entitled to qualified immunity. 
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 The Supreme Court has consistently held that officers 
either did not violate the Fourth Amendment or were entitled 
to qualified immunity when they used deadly force during car 
chases similar to the one at issue here. In Brosseau v. Haugen, 
543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam), the Court held that an officer 
was entitled to qualified immunity after she shot “a disturbed 
felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when 
persons in the immediate area [were] at risk from that flight.” 
Id. at 200. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Court 
concluded that an officer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when he “terminate[d] the car chase by ramming 
his bumper” into the car of a fugitive whose reckless driving 
“posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any 
pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian 
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.” Id. at 381, 
384. This was so even though the officer ran the motorist off 
the road instead of employing the standard “PIT maneuver”5 to 
get the fleeing vehicle to stop, and this decision caused the 
vehicle to run down an embankment and overturn, rendering 
the plaintiff a quadriplegic. Id. at 375. 
 In Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014), decided 
after the events giving rise to this suit, the Court held that 
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment and 
alternatively were entitled to qualified immunity when they 
fatally shot a fugitive whom the officers reasonably believed 
was “intent on resuming” a chase that “pose[d] a deadly threat 
for others on the road.” Id. at 2022. A year later, in Mullenix v. 
                                              
 5 In a Pursuit Intervention Technique maneuver, the 
pursuing vehicle applies pressure to the rear of the fleeing 
vehicle, causing the fleeing vehicle to turn abruptly and come 
to a stop. 
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Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015), the Court concluded that an 
officer who shot and killed a motorist during a high-speed 
pursuit in which the fugitive threatened to kill police officers 
was entitled to qualified immunity, even though the officer’s 
decision to shoot defied his supervisor’s orders. Id. at 306–07, 
312. 
 Like the cases just mentioned, Bland’s behavior 
threatened the safety of the officers, as well as the public at 
large. Before shots were fired at Lincoln Park, Bland drove at 
high speeds, disregarded traffic signals, drove the wrong way 
down a one-way street, collided with two occupied police 
vehicles, and failed to comply with orders to surrender. As the 
gunfire erupted, he repeatedly attempted to flee from police 
and state troopers, including by trying to drive with officers 
standing in close proximity to the Audi. And he engaged in all 
of this behavior in a vehicle that had been reportedly taken at 
gunpoint a few hours earlier. Bland does not direct us to any 
caselaw indicating that, especially in light of the precedent just 
discussed, “only someone plainly incompetent or who 
knowingly violates the law would have perceived a sufficient 
threat and acted as [the state troopers] did” in this situation. 
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 310 (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 
F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that clearly established 
rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and 
Third Circuit precedent or from a “robust consensus of cases 
of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” (citation 
omitted)). Given the troopers’ reasonable belief that Bland was 
armed, and the mortal threat that his conduct posed to those 
around him, the troopers who discharged their weapons at 
Lincoln Park did not violate Bland’s clearly established 
constitutional rights. And because Thompson, Murphy, and 
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Oliveira fired their weapons only at this location, they are 
plainly entitled to qualified immunity. 
D 
 The events at the terminus of the car chase present a 
more complicated picture, but we reach the same conclusion 
because Bland identifies no caselaw indicating that the officers 
violated clearly established law extant in 2011. See Anderson 
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). He instead states in 
conclusory fashion that “every . . . reasonable member of law 
enforcement should be aware that [the officers’] conduct 
would constitute excessive force.” Bland Br. 36. In support, 
Bland argues that the officers were not in a position to see 
whether he made threatening movements inside the vehicle, 
and that the Audi’s impact with the scaffolding rendered it 
inoperable, bringing the car chase to an end.6 As a result, Bland 
contends that Brosseau and Scott no longer control, and we 
should instead look to Tennessee v. Garner for guidance. In 
                                              
 6 After the parties submitted their summary judgment 
papers, Bland received a report from an automotive expert 
concerning whether the Audi could have moved after it 
collided with the scaffolding. The report contained pictures 
taken after the incident, including one that purportedly showed 
the driver’s side tinted window in one piece on the ground. At 
oral argument, Bland contended that this photograph 
demonstrated that the window was up during the final moments 
of the chase, meaning that the officers could neither have seen 
what Bland was doing inside the Audi nor heard his death 
threats. We need not decide whether the District Court properly 
considered this evidence because, even assuming that its 
decision to do so was correct, Bland has failed to show that the 
officers violated clearly established law. 
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Garner, the Supreme Court held that “if the suspect threatens 
the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe 
that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force 
may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where 
feasible, some warning has been given.” Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). Applying that standard, the Court 
concluded that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by 
shooting an “unarmed, nondangerous” suspect in the back of 
the head as he attempted to flee the scene of a burglary. Id. at 
11. 
 Bland’s reliance on Garner is misplaced. The Supreme 
Court has noted that Garner “lay[s] out excessive-force 
principles at only a general level” and “do[es] not by [itself] 
create clearly established law outside an obvious case.” White, 
137 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 (noting that “Garner did not establish a 
magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions 
whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force’”). 
 The officers here confronted a scenario quite different 
from the one presented in Garner, where the officer pursued 
and shot a nondangerous suspect in the back of the head, even 
though the officer was “reasonably sure” the suspect was 
unarmed. 471 U.S. at 3–4; see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201 
(noting that analysis of qualified immunity “depends very 
much on the facts of each case”). This becomes especially clear 
once we consider the officers’ actions “in light of the specific 
context of the case,” as we are required to do. Fields, 862 F.3d 
at 361. The state troopers and Officer Del Mauro—all of whom 
were present at Lincoln Park—continued to pursue a fugitive 
who once again disobeyed traffic lights, drove at excessive 
speeds, and put pedestrians and motorists at great risk. Under 
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Bland’s version of events, at least one innocent civilian 
suffered harm by his flight when a state police car struck an 
occupied vehicle during the final leg of the pursuit. See Scott, 
550 U.S. at 379–80 (noting that the police were “forced to 
engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up” with 
the plaintiff). After the crash, Bland threatened to kill the 
officers, and the record provides no evidence that he attempted 
to surrender at any time. Though the Audi remained pinned 
against the scaffolding, the officers had previously seen Bland 
successfully free the car and continue to flee after the crash at 
Lincoln Park. And although the officers did not see a weapon, 
the police reports of an armed carjacking gave them reason to 
believe Bland was armed. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (noting 
that qualified immunity “turns on the objective legal 
reasonableness of the action” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). This was the situation the officers 
confronted at the terminus of the chase when they discharged 
their weapons. Bland identifies no cases with similar facts that, 
in 2011, would have “put every reasonable offic[er] on notice” 
that using deadly force in such a situation violated clearly 
established constitutional rights. Fields, 862 F.3d at 361 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, accepting (as we 
must) the truth of Bland’s assertions regarding the Audi’s 
immobility and the officers’ ability to see Bland’s hands, our 
conclusion remains the same: the actions taken by the State 
Troopers and Officer Del Mauro are protected by qualified 
immunity. 
 But what about Newark Officers Torres and Martinez, 
who, according to Bland, “arrived on the scene[ and] joined in 
the shooting without knowing whether Mr. Bland was firing at 
them, and without ever first observing Mr. Bland to be in 
possession of any firearm”? Bland Br. 5. The Newark officers 
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contend that video footage refutes this allegation, but we need 
not resolve that dispute.7 Here again, Bland has presented no 
caselaw demonstrating that the officers, who reasonably 
believed that Bland was armed, violated a clearly established 
right by joining in the chaotic scene and discharging their 
weapons. 
 A recent Supreme Court decision demonstrates that 
Torres’s and Martinez’s actions did not violate clearly 
established rights. In White v. Pauly, the Court granted 
qualified immunity to an officer who arrived late to an armed 
confrontation between multiple officers and individuals. 137 S. 
Ct. at 549, 551. After seeing one of the civilians fire shots, the 
defendant officer, without giving a warning, shot and killed 
another individual who pointed a weapon at the officers 
surrounding the house. Id. at 550. The plaintiffs argued that the 
other officers had not adequately alerted the occupants to the 
                                              
7 Though we need not look to the video for guidance, 
we take this opportunity to remind district courts of their 
obligation to do so when necessary to identify disputed issues 
of material fact. At oral argument, the Newark officers 
requested that the District Court consider video footage they 
proffered to counter Bland’s version of events. The Court 
declined this invitation, stating that it did not think it was 
“particularly smart” to “hav[e] judges review individual tapes 
and say, hey, I’m satisfied.” App. 27. Notwithstanding the 
District Court’s independent assessment of the wisdom of this 
approach, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider 
video evidence in the record and to “view[] the facts in the light 
depicted by the videotape,” especially when it “blatantly 
contradict[s]” the nonmovant’s narrative. Scott, 550 U.S. at 
380–81. 
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fact that they were officers, and that White, although late to the 
scene, should have been aware that “corrective action was 
necessary.” Id. at 552. In reversing the denial of qualified 
immunity, the Court stated that “[c]learly established federal 
law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who arrives late to 
an ongoing police action in circumstances like this from 
assuming that proper procedures . . . have already been 
followed,” and that “[n]o settled Fourth Amendment principle 
requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already 
taken by his or her fellow officers.” Id. So too here. In the 
absence of any controlling law to the contrary, Newark 
Officers Martinez and Torres likewise are entitled to qualified 
immunity.8 
IV 
 Because Defendants did not violate any of Bland’s 
clearly established constitutional rights, we will reverse the 
order of the District Court so summary judgment may be 
entered for Defendants. 
                                              
 8 Because Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity, we need not reach the underlying Fourth 
Amendment questions. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Nothing in 
this opinion should be read to suggest that law enforcement 
officers violate the Fourth Amendment where, as here, they 
employ lethal force to neutralize a carjacking suspect 
reasonably perceived to be armed, dangerous, and unwilling to 
peacefully surrender. 
